Differences in Mexican and Civil War Tactics
Despite the great advancement of weaponry, especially of artillery and shoulder-arms, between the Mexican and American Civil Wars, similar development of tactics was nonexistent, and thus the Civil War was fought, to great cost of life, in a fashion fitting the battlefield environment of bygone days. On both sides, military conservatism, though not absolute, hindered progress and resulted in increased casualties.
A veritable revolution in weaponry occurred between the Mexican and Civil Wars, transforming the potential for destruction, especially that of infantry. In 1848, French Captain Claude-Ettienne Minie invented a new bullet which greatly improved the accuracy of firearms, called the Minie Ball. Rather than being round at its base and simply flying out of the weapon upon firing, the Minie Ball was conical at its base, had a few grooves, but remained smaller in diameter than the barrel of the weapon for ease of loading (“The lead minie ball”). The conical shape and grooves allowed it to expand from the heat of ignition and engage the spiraled rifling along the barrel of the gun, giving the projectile gyroscopic action and thus greatly increasing its effective distance by two-and-a-half-times to 250 yards, with lethal potential at up to a thousand, as well as augmenting overall accuracy. The effect was such that the destructive potential of a unit of ground in a formation was eight times higher than under the usage of smooth-bore rifles, though due to the increased accuracy of fire on both sides, formations had to become somewhat sparser (Mahon 61). Though weapons using rifling were already used extensively, they were too slow for any but snipers to use them effectively because the bullet had to be the same diameter as the barrel in order to engage the rifling, and thus liberal use of a ramrod was necessary to force the ball in (“The lead minie ball”). In addition, in the late 1850's, Tyler B. Henry invented the Henry Rifle, which used a metal cartridge, containing the primer, powder, and ball necessary for firing successfully in a single compact container. This allowed for rapid, repeated fire, and later the same concepts made the Spencer Repeating Rifle a precious commodity. In fact, the repeating action was such an advantage that, “Responsible latter day students, and some contemporaries, have claimed that the Union could have armed enough of its men with repeaters to have ended the war in 1862,” (Mahon 58). This was the cusp of a greater revolution which would change the face of warfare forever.
Despite the wondrous advancements in weaponry, a number of factors, including the conservatism of officers educated in the Mexican War, and limited progress in other fields like communications meant the reuse of outdated tactics. The Mexican War was a war which the US had prepared for in advance against a weak country with equipment old sometimes to the point of uselessness. Though America won decisively, occupying Mexico City, perhaps the victory only reinforced the idea that Napoleonic-Era tactics still applied in a new age of warfare. The presence of West Point Cadets in large numbers in each war seems to support this, especially considering that the study of tactics changed very little in intermittent years, and was mainly limited to postgraduates regardless (Stackpole 59). More directly seen is the lack of consistent change in strategy following the development of the Minie Ball; once formations and battles were much more compact as a matter of necessity, as smooth-bore rifles were incapable of striking with much accuracy at significant distance, and the smoke and noise of battle in tandem with the primitive communications limited the effectivity of long-distance commands (Mahon 57). Granted that many of these same conditions still existed during the Civil War, battles were far different, involving armies stretched over miles, with the commanding general often asserting little direct influence over the units most of the time, as with much of the fighting north of Richmond (“The Infantry”). Another factor contributing to the high casualties of the Civil War was the effectiveness of artillery, particularly defensive artillery. Canister shot and rifled bore artillery wreaked havoc on lines packed into tight formations, throwing them into confusion and inflicting massive casualties, while offensive covering fire had difficulty covering critical positions or significantly damaging enemy artillery (Mahon 59). Once again, the experience in the Civil War differed vastly from the Mexican War, in which Mexican shells often would bounce uselessly on the ground such that American troops could dodge them. American soldiers had little experience in such sophisticated resistance, as the only declared war before the Mexican War was the War of 1812. One scholar asserts, “Field officers had little if any opportunity to exercise command over so much as a full-sized battalion. For all practical purposes the training of line officers above the rank of captain was theoretical... those who attained high rank had to learn their jobs by trial and error, with the emphasis too frequently on the latter (Stackpole 58).” Seeing as most of the officer corps of the Civil War were junior officers during the Mexican War, with a few notable exceptions, like the legendary Winfield Scott, this explains the lackluster performance of many generals later. The experiences had and lessons learned from the Mexican War were of little use in fighting the Civil War, but the officer corps, most of whom were schooled in Napoleonic strategy, continued to use obsolete tactics to the cost of tens of thousands of American lives.
So much changed in the way of military weaponry between the Mexican War and Civil War, revolutionizing the art of war, yet progress tactically was lacking, as well as practical experience for commanding officers. Subsequently, a modern war was fought in the past with disastrous consequences.
Works Cited
“Henry Rifle.” CivilWar@Smithsonian. 21 May, 2011. http://www.civilwar.si.edu/weapons_henry.html.
“The Infantry Tactics.” National Park Service. 20 May, 2011. http://www.nps.gov/archive/peri/inf2_tac.htm.
“The lead minie ball.” CivilWar@Smithsonian. 22 May, 2011. http://www.civilwar.si.edu/weapons_minieball.html.
Mahon, John K. “Civil War Infantry Assault Tactics.” Jstor. 20 May, 2011. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/stable/1984988?seq=3&Search=yes&searchText=mexican&searchText=civil&searchText=tactics&searchText=war&list=hide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dmexican%2Bwar%2Bcivil%2Bwar%2Btactics%26Search.x%3D0%26Search.y%3D0%26wc%3Don&prevSearch=&item=3&ttl=4193&returnArticleService=showFullText&resultsServiceName=null.
Stackpole, E.J. “Generalship in the Civil War.” Jstor. 21 May, 2011. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/stable/1985286?seq=1&Search=yes&searchText=mexican&searchText=civil&searchText=tactics&searchText=war&list=hide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicResults%3Fhp%3D25%26la%3D%26wc%3Don%26acc%3Don%26gw%3Djtx%26jcpsi%3D1%26artsi%3D1%26Query%3Dmexican%2Bwar%2Bcivil%2Bwar%2Btactics%26sbq%3Dmexican%2Bwar%2Bcivil%2Bwar%2Btactics%26si%3D26%26jtxsi%3D26&prevSearch=&item=31&ttl=4193&returnArticleService=showFullText&resultsServiceName=null.